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  • Time Period > Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-) (remove)
  • Contributor > O'Brien, Lawrence F. (Lawrence Francis), 1917-1990 (remove)

32 results

  • motivated. We want to thank them in advance for what they were going to do. The bottom line was we ought to try to at least informally organize them rather than be totally dependent on brief telephone conversations that had taken place over a period of time
  • . It was a matter of clearing the air, but the implementation in terms of the structure of the campaign was never discussed in any detail. I was left, when I arrived at the headquarters, to pursue my own course. As I mentioned, Gary Hart had a lengthy conversation
  • with immediately." Because there was no way that I could carry on this conversation with Mary McGrory. So I got rid of her and I closed the office door and buzzed Phyllis Maddock, now Nason, my long-time assistant. I said to her, "The President said he's naming me
  • to undertake an active role. It was more exploring what potential he had and how he might go about it. I recall particularly a small cottage alongside the railroad track, with a smaller cottage adjoining where his mother lived. It recalled conversations I had
  • reforms; McGovern's 1972 campaign financing; O'Brien's efforts to attack Richard Nixon; the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) scandal; how O'Brien became chairman of the 1972 Democratic National Convention; Daley's reaction to his
  • this information against Nixon? O: Actually, when this information finally developed into something assumed meaningful with the Anna Chennault situation, it was very late in the campaign. It was not brought to my attention. This is not general conversation
  • . We had any number of conversations, obviously, over the years, but I don't recall anything like that, and I have to assume that conversation was held in his office because it was recorded. G: It was a telephone conversation. O: Oh, was it? Yes, I
  • to consider Watergate from its beginning in chronological order and to discuss all its aspects: its motivation, its impact and its end result. The first realization I had that there was animosity toward me in the White House was a conversation with Rowland
  • ; the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) case; O'Brien's June 1972 request that the Federal Bureau of Investigation look into the Watergate break-in and the response from Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen; O'Brien's correspondence
  • by Nixon, who discussed this with me as a result of a detailed conversation with the President-Elect. The Nixon Administration ran with it. I was asked by the President to co-chair a citizens' committee to carry on this advocacy. I considered it totally non
  • back to conversations we had early on and the understanding between Bobby and Hubert. There hadn't been any meanness up to California involving Hubert. Hubert was playing the game as he should play it: let Gene and Bobby kick each other around. Hubert
  • : He just happened to be at the--? O: I had never met Mitchell prior to that. Mitchell chatted about sports. It was a conversation being carried on among three or four or five people, whatever. But finally Mitchell brought up Watergate. He said he
  • A March 1973 memo from Charles Colson to H. R. Haldeman regarding Richard Kleindienst's confirmation as U.S. attorney general, International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) files, false testimony by U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell
  • and the state of McDonnell and Company. In those conversations that led to accepting the position, we had discussion regarding broadening and diversifying McDonell and Company well beyond the brokerage firm, with thirty-five hundred or four thousand employees
  • proceeded to pick up the phone and gave the White House telephone operator the names of the twenty-two and chased them all over town. I don't recall he had caught all twentytwo by the time I went home, but he stayed with it. He'd have some conversations
  • room and Frank in turn had the counsel for CBS. The conversation became a little intense as the luncheon unfolded. Frank made no reference to having heard from the White House and that's understandable. That never surfaced until years later. He chose
  • -called O'Brien manual and had implemented it in all respects, and he therefore felt his people had done a good job at the convention. He was quite proud of this. We had, for the first time, in 1960 installed floor telephones and had a telephone system
  • and also Vance Hartke [offered] an amendment to exempt local telephone service from the excise tax restoration. [Editor's note: Prouty's amendment extended minimum social security payments to people seventy or older who had not been eligible before.] O
  • Security eligibility and exempt local telephone services from the excise tax restoration; the annual debate over raising the debt ceiling and foreign aid; a proposed rider exempting the proposed National Football League (NFL)-American Football League (AFL
  • -organized opposition. That was part of the process. G: What specifically did Mrs. Johnson do to advance the legislation? O: She had conversations with a number of members of Congress. She spent her time on the telephone, and when members of Congress came
  • without any established timetable and an agenda would be developed through telephone conversations. President Kennedy, in my judgment, was not convinced that cabinet meetings were very productive. Consequently he didn't have them on a regular basis
  • , courteous and low-key. We discussed this. He had a staff man with him and it was Ted and I. And the conversation led to presenting the letter. I at least, and I think Ted shared that view, realized that the staff representative, and I can't even remember his
  • the case. G: Let's go back to 1964 and the legislative operation again. What I've just handed you is a telephone list of senators to call and subjects to take up with them. It's not clear who was to make those calls, whether the President was or you were
  • a conspiracy or anything of that nature? O: No, I don't recall any conversations with him on the assassination. There were probably references to it, but it just never came into our discussions. My sole after-the-fact involvement was, as I recall it, being
  • running mate and RFK's concern that the conversation might have been recorded; whether or not RFK wanted to be vice president; a memo LBJ dictated to Walter Jenkins about his meeting with RFK; the candidates LBJ considered for his vice presidential running
  • wound up and it might not by that stage be productive at all. It could be a matter of reminiscences, conversation, projections, and talking about individual members, perhaps. G: Did you have an impression that he just didn't like to be alone, that he
  • to have some rate adjustments ultimately enacted. Beyond that, the President was beginning to focus on the election of 1968, and I found that I was in conversations with him over 1967 more and more. Those conversations involved evaluations and planning
  • and Senate leadership and problems with the whip system in the House; the increase in concern over the Vietnam War among congressmen; the work of John McCormack, Carl Albert, and Hale Boggs as house majority whips; O'Brien's conversation with Chicago Mayor
  • on the money." That's always in political campaigns. I'm sure your conversation with Louie Martin revealed that in that area there was a particularly unique approach to this. G: At the time there was a lot of press speculation that you might replace John
  • to the point where any action had been taken. Conversations took place of an informal nature, but anything in an organizational sense had not occurred. That is awfully late. So it has to be people in their spare moments giving some thought to a campaign
  • should be retained to produce some spots. O: Yes, I did meet with him. We went over in detail what I envisioned to be the thrust. We met with others who were involved doing the bio. G: Tell me about your conversations with Tony Schwartz and your
  • that gave him a true belief that he had a good shot at the nomination. I don't recall now, but I remember Johnson and I discussing specific states in conversations over the intervening years. G: North Carolina, Arizona. . . . 11 LBJ Presidential Library
  • to the reality of attempting to enact a specific program. I made no specific comment that I can recall, and the conversation terminated when we reached the Oval Office. That was a passing commentary that I thought was indicative of some concern that the father
  • critical comments. He did not want to lessen his on-the-record support and yet as early as January of 1966 you see indications of my conversation with him, my report to the President by this memo, that he was beginning to express concern
  • , but I never really reached a point where you would say, "What is he going to do in the next forty-eight hours?" G: Collins, I believe, did come down to Washington and met with you sometime. O: Yes, I do recall a conversation. I believe also
  • of the zip code; working with, and learning from, European mail systems; trips to Europe to learn about their postal systems; O'Brien's visit with Pope Paul VI and their conversation regarding Vietnam; efforts to improve mail service between the U.S
  • on it. The only subject of discussion had been this Senate situation, which I did not seriously consider. I am sure I would not have run for the Senate. So the Johnson procedure and style came into play, and we had a long conversation which really was sort of one